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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises out of two separate, but related, non-judicial foreclosure sales.

Petitioner, Larry Spencer ("Spencer"), defaulted on two separate promissory notes and the two
underlying deeds of trust. Respondent, Davidson Trust Company, Custodian for W S E P
Account No. 68-0811-30 ("Davidson Trust"), was the beneficiary under both deeds of trust. The
Successor Trustee, James Raeon, initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings pursuant to both
deeds of trust. Davidson Trust was the high bidder at both non-judicial foreclosure sales and was
given Trustee Deeds to the underlying real property.
Spencer filed the present action claiming "irregularities" in both non-judicial foreclosure
sales. Spencer sought a declaratoryjudgment to set aside and reschedule the sales and monetary
damages in the form of an alleged surplus of h d s from the two sales. Respondent Dee Jameson
("Jameson") has been named individually and his only association to this case is that he is a
beneficiary of the W S E P account held by Davidson Trust. The Successor Trustee, James
Raeon, is named as a Defendant but has never appeared in the action.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Spencer filed the underlying Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages on April

27,2006. (Clerk's Record on Appeal "It.",p. 1).
Spencer filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages on the
same date. @., p. 26).
Counsel for Jameson filed a Notice of Appearance on May 17,2006. (R., p. 39).
Counsel for Davidson Trust filed a Notice of Appearance on May 18,2006. (R. p. 41).

Jameson filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint and Affirmative Defenses on June
20,2006. (R., p. 43).
Jameson submitted discovery, including Request for Admissions, to Spencer on July 26,
2006. (Clerk's Augmented Record on Appeal "AIL', p. 41).
Spencer responded to the Request for Admissions on August 29,2006. (AR., p. 41).
Jameson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with a Memorandum and
supporting Affidavits on November 3,2006. (AR., pp. 15,17,28, & 32).
On January 16,2007, Spencer filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Jameson's Motion
for Summary Judgment along with supporting M~davits.(AR., pp. 52,75 & 94).
Jameson filed a Reply to Spencer's Memorandum in Opposition to Jameson's Motion for
Jndgment on January 23,2007. (AR., p. 98).

S-ary

On January 26, 2007, Davidson Trust filed a joinder in Jameson's Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R., p. 55).
The District Court heard oral arguments on January 29,2007. (Tr. P. 4, Ln. 18).
On March 1,2007, Davidson Trust filed an Answer to Amended Complaint. (R., p. 64).
On March 6,2007, the District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting
Jameson's Motion for Summary Judgment as it applies to all defendants. (IL,p. 72).
On March 20,2007, Spencer filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration. (AR.,
p. 117).
Jameson and Davidson Trust each filed a Response to Spencer's Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification. (AR., pp. 139 & 148).
The

District

Coud

heard

oral

arguments

on

Reconsideration/Clarificationon May 22,2007. (Tr. P. 3, Ln. 4-7).

Spencer's

Motion

for

At the hearing, the District Court requested additional factual statements and legal
authority from the parties before rendering its opinion. (Tr. P. 25, Ln. 8-15 and Tr. P. 26, Ln. 14-

The parties submitted the requested briefing on or before May 29, 2007. (AFL, pp. 151,

On July 25,2007, the District Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order denying
Spencer's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification. (R., p. 82).
Spencer filed the present appeal on August 17,2007. (R-, p. 90).
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On or about April 30, 2002, Spencer executed a promissory note in favor of Davidson

Trust agreeing to repay the amount of $90,000.00. (AR., p. 32).
2.

The obligation under this promissory note was secured by a deed of trust for the

following described parcels of red property in Kootenai County, Idaho:
PARCEL 1:
Lot 1, Block 1, BIG TIMBER, according to the plat recorded in Book "G" of Plats at
Page 457, records of Kootenai County, Idaho.
PARCEL 2:
Lot 2, Block 1, BIG TIMBER, according to the plat recorded in Book "G" of Plats at
Page 457, records of Kootenai County, Idaho.
PARCEL 3:
The South half of the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter
of Section 7, Township 52, North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County,
Idaho, less U.S. Highway 95. Formerly known as Block 1I, Spokane Valley Commercial
Orchard Tracts.
Together with 1981 Skyline Mobile Home, 24x56, Vin #01910302P

(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Real Property") (This entire transaction is hereinafter
r e f e d to as the "First Deed of Trust"). (AR., pp. 32-33).
3.

On November 14,2002, Spencer executed a second promissory note in favor of Davidson

Trust agreeing to repay the additional loaned amount of $65,000.00. (AIL, p. 33).
4.

The obligation under the second note was secured by a deed of trust only on Parcel 3,

above. (This entire transaction is hereinafter referred to as the "Sewnd Deed of Trust") (AR., p.
33).

5.

In relation to the Sewnd Deed of Trust, Spencer and Davidson Trust entered into a "Loan

Commitment Agreement" whereby Spencer agreed to make several enumerated improvements to
the Real Property and funds would be released to him upon completion of each item. (AR., pp.
34 & 36-38).
6.

Michael Thompson, an unrelated third person and not a party to the present action,

subordinated his lien on the Real Property to both the First Deed of T m t and the Second Deed
of Trust. (AR, pp. 135-138).

7.

Spencer defaulted on his repayment obligation under both the First Deed of Trust and

Sewnd Deed of Trust and non-judicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated by the Successor
Trustee, James Raeon. (AR., pp. 29 & 46).
8.

On February 24, 2005, two separate non-judicial foreclosure sales were held at the

Successor Trustee's office. (AIL, p. 29).
9.

The sales were wnducted in reverse chronological order. The sale under the Sewnd

Deed of Trust was conducted at 10:OO a.m. (AR., p. 29).
10.

Spencer did a t attend this sale. (AR., p. 29).

IS.

As of February 24, 2005, the total obligation owed by Spencer pursuant to the Second

Deed of Trust, inclusive of all costs, interest and fees, was $86,507.45. (AR., p. 87).
12.

Davidson Trust submitted a credit bid in the amount of $86,507.45. (AR., pp. 29 & 87).

13.

Davidson Trust's bid at the Second Deed of Trust sale was the highest and Davidson

Trust was given a Trustee's Deed to parcel 3. (AR., p. 29).
14.

The sale under the First Deed of Trust was conducted at 10:30 am. (AR., p. 29).

15.

Spencer

16.

As of February 24,2005, the total obligation owed by Spencer pursuant to the First Deed

attend this sale. (AR., p. 29).

of Trust, inclusive of all costs a d fees, was $1 17,566.92. (AR., p. 88).
17.

Davidson Trust submitted a credit bid in the amount of $204,074.37, which included the

amounts due under both the First Deed of Trust and Second Deed of Trust. (AR., pp. 29 & 88).
18.

Spencer bid $10.00 at the sale. (AR. p. 29).

19.

Davidson Trust's bid at the First Deed of Trust sale was the highest and Davidson Trust

was given a Trustee's Deed to the Real Property. (AR., pp. 29-30).
20.

The Trustee's Deeds for the First Deed of Trust sale and Second Deed of Trust sale were

recorded at 11:29 a.m. and 11:30 am. on February 24,2005. (R. pp. 18-19; 20-22).

II.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether Jameson is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 12-120,12-12162 12-123?

B.

Whether the District Court properly granted Summary Judgment in favor of the
Defendants?

The award of attorney f&s is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is
remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction
comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under LC. 4 12-120(3)
unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which
the party is attempting to recover. Gunter v. Mumhv's Lounge. LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 105 P.3 676
(2005).
In Tavlor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 59, P.3d 308 (2002), Taylor filed a lawsuit seeking a
declaratory judgment and an order directing a trustee of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to execute
and deliver a trust deed to him as the highest bidder at the sale. Taylor was the prevailing party
at the lower court level and was awarded attorney fees pursuant to 12-120(3). The Idaho
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, but in doing so, awarded the trustee its costs
and attorney fees because it found that the non judicial foreclosure sale was a commercial
transaction. The same result should apply in the present case.

In addition, Idaho Code 4 12-121 provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing
party. "Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court
only when it finds, from the facts presented to if that the case was brought, pursued or defended
£iivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." IRCP 54(e)(l). "This determination rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702,99 P.3d 1092 (2004).

Idaho Code 5 12-123 W e r provides for an award of attorney fees for frivolous conduct
in civil actions. Frivolous conduct means filing a civil action that is not supported in fact or
w m t e d undef existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law. I.C. 3 12-123.
From the outset, Dee Jameson has objected to being named in his individual capacity in
this lawsuit. Mr. Jameson, individually, is not named in any of the numerous contracts, notes or
deeds of trusts that make up the underlying commercial transaction.

Mr. Jameson's only

relationship to this case is that he is the beneficiary of the UWSEP account. Neither of the codefendants made concerted efforts to defend the claims. As such, Mr. Jameson took it upon
himself to file an answer, discovery and the motion for summary judgment. Clearly a claim
against Mr. Jameson, individually, is not supported by the facts or warranted under existing law
and he requests an award of reasonable attorney fees in this regard.

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review.

A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in that party's favor as to all or any part thereof. Rule 56(b), Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. The judgment sought shall be forthwith rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held:

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court uses the same standard
employed by the trial court when deciding such a motion. 'If the pleadings, depositions,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law' s u m m q judgment is proper. The burden is on the moving party to prove an
absence of genuine issues of material fact. In addition, tbis Court views the facts and
inferences in the record in favor of the non-moving party.
Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School District #84, 142 Idaho 804,806, 134 P.3d 655,657 (2006)
(Citations Omitted).

B.

Summary Judgment was Properly Granted in Favor of the Respondents.

There are no genuine issues of material fact and Respondents are entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. Spencer filed the present action seeking two different remedies. First,
Spencer asked the District Court to set aside the non-judicial foreclosure sales and reschedule
them for another sale.

In the alternative, Spencer asked the District Court to award him an

alleged surplus of money arising out of the foreclosure sale bids. However, the record clearly
shows that Spencer is not entitled to either relief.
1.

The Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sales Should Not Be Set Aside.

Spencer alleges that there were "irregularities" and the District Court should have ordered
that the foreclosure sales be rescheduled. However, Spencer has offered no authority which
would give the courts the power to reschedule the non-judicial foreclosure sales at issue. In fact,
the Idaho statutes are quite clear:

FINALITY OF SALE. A sale made by a trustee under this act shall foreclose and
terminate all interest in the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to whom
w v e n under section 45-1506. Idaho Code, and of any other person claimhiz by,
through or under such persons and such persons shall have no right to redeem the
property from the purchaser at the trustee's sale. The failure to give notice to any of such
persons by mailing, personal service, posting or publication in accordance with section
45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect the validity of the sale as to persons so notified nor
as to any such versons having actual knowledPe of the sale. Furthermore, any failure to
comply with the provisions of section 45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect the validity
of a sale in favor of a purchaser in good faith for value at or after such sale, or any
successor in interest thereof.
I.C. 5 45-1508 (Emphasis added).

Spencer's Amended Complaint makes no alIegations that he did not receive adequate
notice of the foreclosure sales at issue in this case. (R., pp. 26-38). In fact, Spencer has admitted

in discovery that he is not makiig any claims based upon the form, content or service of the
notices of foreclosure sales in this case.

"REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17: Please admit you received all notices of
foreclosure sale to which you were entitled pursuant to Idaho law.

RESPONSE: Admit.
RJXOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18: Please admit you are not making any
allegations in the present action as to the form, content or service of any of the
foreclosure notices issued by the Trustee in this case.

RESPONSE: Admit."
(AR, P. 47).

Spencer's own admissions show that he received all notices of the non-judicial
foreclosure sales at issue in the present case. Spencer did not appear at the f i t sale, but he did
appear at the second sale. He was provided the opportunity to bid at the second sale and he only
bid $10.00. He was outbid by Davidson Trust and his interest in the property has been
terminated pursuant to the clear language of Idaho law.
In his Brief on Appeal, Spencer states "Davidson Trust argued it is a bona fide
purchaser and the non-judicial sales are final." (Spencer's Brief on Appeal, p. 24). This
statement is incorrect for several reasons. F i t , the Defendants have never argued they are bona
fide purchasers. He is apparently referring to the last sentence in LC. § 45-1508. But, the statute

has three sentences with three separate and distinct meanings. The first sentence states that
notice of the foreclosure sale effectively terminates all interests of that person after the sale is

completed. The second sentence states that failure to give notice shall not affect the validity as
to those who actually received notice. Spencer admits he received the notices of the foreclosure
sales and even attended one of the sales. As such, the first two sentences of LC.

9 45-1508

effectively terminate his interest therein. The last sentence states that even if a person did not get
notice of the sale, their interest is terminated against a bona fide purchaser.

This is not

applicable because Spence admittedly received notice of the sale. As such, the non-judicial
foreclosure sales should not be set aside and rescheduled.
2.

Spencer is Not Entitled to Any AIleged Surplus.
a.

Facts

The foreclosure sales were done in reverse chronological order. The foreclosure sale
pursuant to the Second Deed of Trust (Parcel 3) occurred first at 10:OO am. on February 24,
2005. Spencer did

attend this sale. Davidson Trust submitted a credit bid of the then

remaining balance owed, $86,507.45, and was awarded a Trustee's Deed.
The foreclosure sale pursuant to the First Deed of Trust (Parcels 1, 2 & 3) occurred a
short time later at 10:30 a.m. Spencer

attend this sale and bid $10.00. Davidson Trust

submitted a credit hid of the then remaining balance owed under the First and Second Deeds of
Trust, $204,074.37. Davidson Trust was the high bidder and was given a Trustee's Deed to the
Real Property. The Trustee's Deeds for both sales were recorded an hour later.
b.

Credit Bids.

There is no question that Idaho law allows for the use of credit bids in foreclosure sales.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
The principle articulated in the above-cited cases is compatible with LC. 5 45-1506 and,
indeed, it makes a good deal of practical sense. There is no reason why the holder of the
deed of trust note should not be able to purchase the property at a trustee sale by bidding
in all or part of the amount owing pursuant to the note. Afler all, the holder of the note is

the party to be benefited by the sale. It makes no sense to require the note holder to bring
cash to the sale in order to pay himself. His bid, if successful, immediately reduces or
eliminates the debtor's obligation. We hold where the holder of the deed of trust note is
the bidder, crediting the bid against the note is the equivalent of a cash sale. The district
court properly held that the credit bid here complied with the statutory requirements.
Federal Home Loan M o r t m e Cornoration v. Auuel, 143 Idaho 42, 45, 137 P.3d 429, 432
(2006).
The question then becomes whether Davidson Trust could combine the amounts due
under both Deed of Trusts as a credit bid at the second sale.

Idaho law allows for the

combination of bids at a foreclosure sale:
Where the holder of a special lien is compelled to satisfl a prior lien for his own
protection, he may enforce payment of the amount so paid by him, as part of the claim for
which his own lien exists.
Idaho Code fi 45-105.
In Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177,181-82,677 P.2d 490 (1984), the Idaho Supreme
Court expanded on the issue of combining foreclosure bids:
Idaho Code 3 45-903 provides: "The lien of a mortgage is special, unless otherwise
expressly agreed, and is independent of possession." Since the second deed of trust held
by the Thompsons was functionally equivalent to a mortgage, we hold that the
Thompsons' lien was special. Accordingly, LC. fi 45-105 entitled them to include
payments they made to prevent foreclosure of the first deed of trust as part of the
mortgage indebtedness created by !heir junior encumbrance. See also Miller v. Stavros,
174 So. 2d 48,49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that "amounts paid by the holder of
a second mortgage to protect his security are properly included in a decree foreclosing the
second mortgage"). Moreover, the deed of trust signed by Mr. Kirsch specifically
required him, as one of the grantors, to pay when due "all [prior] encumbrances, charges
and liens, with interest." It authorized the Thompsons to make such payments when
deemed necessary to protect the securily of the second deed of trust. F i l l y , it gave the
Thompsons the right to recover such advances from the grantors "with interest from the
date of expenditure at eight pereent per amum."
Thomuson, 106 Idaho at 181-82.
Admittedly, this is not a case of a junior lienor paying off a senior lien. But, the analogy
is still applicable because this case presents the unique circumstance where the holder of the two

most senior lien positions on the Real Property is the same entity. When a junior lienor pays off
the senior lien, the junior lienor then puts themselves in the situation of having the two most
senior liens. This is functionally equivalent to what was done in this case.
b e d i a t e l y prior to the first sale, Davidson Trust was owed a combined $204,074.37
fkom Spencer. At the first sale, Davidson Trust bid $86,507.45, the amount owed under the
second note. At the second d e , Davidson Trust needed to protect its rights by bidding not only
the $117,566.92 held by Davidson Trust as the senior lienholder, but also the $86,507.45, the
"part of the lien for which his own lien exists." See Idaho Code $45-105.
An argument could also be made that the Second Deed of Trust and the subsequent sale

were superfluous. The First Deed of Trust specifically states that it is entered into "to secure
payment of all such further sums as may hereafter he loaned or advanced by the Beneficiary
herein to the Grantor herein, or any or either of them, while record owner of present interest, for
any purposes, and of any notes, drafts or other investments representing such M e r loans,
advances or expenditures together with interest on all such sums as at the rate therein provided."

(R, p. 14). This language, in and of itself, allows Davidson Trust to bid the 111 $204,074.37 at
the second sale.
Spencer argues that allowing a combination of credit bids would give a note holder a

virtual blank check to bid at the foreclosure sales and would have a chilling effect on the ability
for others to bid. (See Spencer's Brief on Appeal, p. 25-26). However, Davidson Trust is not
arguing that it can just pick any number out of the air and submit it as its own bid. Davidson
Trust was owed $204,074.37 prior to the first sale. How much did Davidson Trust bid at the
second sale? $204.074.37. This does no have a chilling effect on others ability to bid. If Spencer

had bid $204,074.38, he would have held title to a11 three parcels and Davidson Trust would have
received all of its money back. Everyone benefits under this scenario.
c.

Distribution.

Further, it makes practical sense to allow the combination of credit bids when the two
most senior lienholders are the same entity because of the distribution statutes. The Idaho Code
states:
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale as follows:

(1) To the expenses of the sale, including a reasonable charge by the trustee and a
reasonable attorney's fee.
(2) To the obligation secured by the trust deed.
(3) To any persons having recorded liens subsequent to the interest of the trustee in the
trust deed as their interests may appear.
(4) The surplus, if any, to the grantor of the trust deed or to his successor in interest
entitled to such surplus.
Idaho Code 5 45-1507.
In this case, Davidson Trust bid $204,074.37 at the second sale. The Trustee would
apply these proceeds first to the expenses of the sale and the amount owed under the First Deed
of Trust ($117,566.92). The remaining balance ($86,507.45) would be applied to the next lien in
fine. There is no dispute that the Trustee's Deed issued after the first sale was not recorded until
11:30 a.m. As such, the Second Deed of Trust was still a lien and senior to all other liens. After
this distribution of $86,507.45, there is no surplus to distribute to Spencer or any other third
Party.
Spencer's Amended Complaint also alleges, incorrectly, that he is entitled to the surplus
proceeds. (R, pp. 35-37). But, Michael Thompson was the holder of a junior deed of trust on
Parcels 1 & 3. (AR, p. 124). Thompson subordinated his interest in favor of both the Fist Deed

of Trust and the Second Deed of Trust. (AR, p. 135-138). Both subordination agreements have
nearly identical language:
WHEREAS, it is a condition precedent to obtaining said loan that said deed of trust last
above-mentioned shall unconditionally be and remain at all times a lien or charge upon
the land hereinbefore described, prior and superior to the lien or charge of the deed of
trust first above-mentioned;

(1) That said deed of trust securing said note in favor of Lender, and any renewals or
extensions thereof, shall unconditionall~be and remain at all times a lien or charge on
the property therein described, prior and superior to the lien or charge of the deed of
trust first above-mentioned.
(Id.) (Emphasis added).
These subordination agreements show two things. First, the Second Deed of Trust had
priority over Thompson's deed of trust even though the sale had been completed. The Second
Deed of Trust was unconditionally, at all times, a prior and superior lien to Thompson's lien.

In addition, this also shows that Spencer would not be entitled to any surplus under the
distribution statutes. Thompson would be ahead of Spencer if, hypothetically, there was any
surplus money to distribute. Therefore, Spencer has failed to state a claim for which relief can

be granted. (R., p. 49).
d.

Equity

There would be an inequitable result assuming Davidson Trust was only allowed to bid
$117,566.92 at the second sale. If Spencer (or any third party for that matter) bid even one
penny more than Davidson Trust, Spencer would be given title to the three parcels and Davidson
Trust would have received $1 17,566.92.
But, the central question the court needs to ask itself: What happened to the $86,507.45

Davidson Trust loaned pursuant to DOT 2?

The IRAISEP account

pursue a deficiency balance because DOT 2 has been

foreclosed. As such, Spencer walks away from a tofaI indebtedness of $204,074.37, after paying
only $1 17,566.92. He defaults on

separate promissory notes and has the ability to walk

away fiom the $86,507.45 without paying a dime. Quite simply, the IRAISEP account had no
choice but to bid $204,074.37 at the second sale in order to protect its security. If it did not bid
this amount and was outbid by Spencer, or any other thud party, it would lose $86,507.45. This
would be an unjust result for the Respondents.
The same inequities would apply if the Court declared, as requested by Spencer, &at
$290,581.82. spencer is asking the Court for Davidson Trust to pay him $86,507.45 after he
defaulted on not one, but two different promissory notes.
e.

Personal Property.

The character of the mobile home as real property or personal property has no bearing on
this case. The non-judicial foreclosure sales complied with all aspects of LC.

9 45-1502, et seq.

Spencer was loaned $90,000.00 under the First Deed of Trust. As collateral, he voluntarily
signed the First Deed of Trust, which included a reference to his mobile home. (See R., pp.1415). Spencer defaulted on the underlying note and the Successor Trustee began nou-judicial
foreclosure proceedings. The Successor Trustee foreclosed on the four comers of the Deeds of
Trust. Spencer received all notices to which he was entitled and he even appeared at the second
sale. The fact that there was a reference to a mobile home does not invalidate the proper
procedures taken pursuant to the foreclosure statutes. Moreover, any damages he allegedly
sustained would be against the Successor Trustee who has never appeared in this action.

f.

$5,000.00

In connection with the Sewnd Deed of Trust the parties entered into a Loan Commitment
Agreement whereby Davidson Trust held back the sum of $42,500.00 and would disperse the
funds to Spencer upon seven enumerated items related to improvement of the secured property.
n e r e is no dispute that Spencer completed items (a) through ( f ) on the Loan Commitment
Agreement and was paid $37,500.00.
Spencer is also not disputing the fact that he did

complete item "(g): Mobile remodel

costs, including windows, carpets, drywall, etc. (to be paid upon completion)." He did not
complete the condition of the contract, so $5,000.00 was not dispersed to him.
But, the issue of the $5,000.00 is a red herring and does not create a genuine issue of
material fact for two reasons. Fist, this money is still charged to the account of Spencer because
its intended use was to improve the secured property. It was not the properly of Davidson Trust.
It was held in trust until Spencer completed the item (g). If Spencer had, at any time, provided
Davidson Trust with sufficient evidence that he completed item (g), he would have received his
$5,000.00. But, he admits he never did this. DOT 2 specifically allows Davidson Trust to make
any advances necessary to protect the security interest and charge the account of Spencer.
Spencer failed to perform his duty under the contract and Davidson Trust was required to
remodeUrepair the mobile home and expended the $5,000.00 in doing so. This situation is no
different than Spencer agreeing to pay all property taxes when due. He did not pay the property
taxes and they were charged to his acwunt.
Perhaps more importantly, Spencer would not even be entitled to the $5,000.00 if it had
created a surplus. An individual by the name of Mike Thompson held a junior lien in the
Property. Mr. Thompson unconditionally subordinated his interest in the Property to both Deeds

of Trust held by Davidson Trust. If the $5,000.00 created a surplus, it would have gone to Mr.
Thompson, not Spencer. Mr. Thompson is not a party to the present action. As argued before
the lower court, it is doubtful Spencer was even a real party in interest to begin the proceedings.

V.

CONCLUSION

There are no genuine issues of material fact and the Respondents were properly granted a
judgment as a matter of law. The non-judicial foreclosure sales terminate all of Spencer's
interest in the Real Property because Spencer admits he receive all notices to which he was
entitled. As such, the non-judicial foreclosure sales are final and should not be rescheduled. In
addition, Spencer is not entitled to any alleged surplus fiom the non-judicial foreclosure sales.
Davidson Trust properly submitted a credit bid for the amounts owed under both the Fist Deed
of Trust and Second Deed of Trust. As such, there was no surplus to distribute. Even if there

was an alleged surplus, there was at least one other person, not a party to the present action, who
had priority over Spencer. As such, Spencer fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. It is therefore respectfully requested that the Court affirm the decision of the lower
court.
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